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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 779 
Accident time: 09:53 Accident Date: 22/03/2007 
Where it occurred: Nr Nunavil West, 
Thenmaradichi District, 
Jaffna Province, see 
detailed map reference
Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: 24/03/2007 
ID original source: None Name of source: Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
demolition site 
(explosives) 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: IMASA [Sic] Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: 404.766.00 E Map north: 1,068.649.00 N 
Map scale: Chavakachcheri Map series: ABMP 
Map edition: 01 Map sheet: 4 
Map name: 1:50000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is an IMSMA “tick-box” 
record. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. 
Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes 
available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
IMSMA record extracts 
Task: EOD task 
Place of accident: field [GPS recorded] near residential buildings 
Cause of accident: “Misjudgment of effectiveness of protective work.” 
Reference to inquiry report 
I have been to the particular spot together with the Programme Manger and Technical Advisor 
from [other Demining group]. I explained the whole flow of the task, where we we found it, 
where we moved it, position of all personnel during the demolition etc I have also giving them 
all my records of timings and a narrative as below including pictures and a movie of the 
demolition. 
Accident description:  
“The day of the accident [Dmeining group] was out in the field to do EOD tasks, UXO 
clearance on request by DMAO of objects not safe to move or transport. This particular day 
[Demining group] had planned to do 5 task but ended up in doing one more task, so totally 6 
objects/UXOs was destroyed. All tasks was already surveyed and prepared for demolition, 
protective work etc. 
The accident demolition was the first that day in a row of six demolitions. The target was a 
120mm artillery shell. Beforehand we had digged a 1.1 m deep pit away from the closest 
village and had sandbagged the side towards the village. The shell was moved from where it 
was found, by hand, into the pit just prior to setting up the demolition. The shell was by 
purpose put closer to the wall in the pit that faced the village. When every thing was set up 
and sentries were in place we carried out the demolition. The shell went high order. I could 
short after - few seconds hear a few falling fragmentations around the firing point. I went 
forward alone to inspect the demolition pit and gave all clear. On my way back to the firing 
point the QA officer approached me and said that one of the deminers was injured, we walked 
or to that position. The deminer was already taken care of by the medic. I was told that one 
FALLING fragmentation (NOT DIRECT) had hit him on his left shoulder, right on to the collar 
bone. There was three scratches or small cuts in the skin. The deminer was conscious the 
whole time and said he had pain. When we came carried on to the next task and had done 
the preparations, the deminer asked for permission to go to hospital as his shoulder / upper 
arm was numb. I asked him and the medic if it could wait until we reached the next task and 
could send him with another team’s truck so we could go on with the prepared and coming 
demolition. They agreed so we carried on. When coming to the location of the truck I 
arranged for the deminer to be transported to the hospital. After that I WAS TOLD that they 
cleaned some sand out of the small cuts and X-rayed him (See medical report). He was 
released from hospital after one day of observation. The accident is reported to the police in 
Chavakachcheri as well. 
Device: 120mm artillery shell. 
Victim did not wear Protective equipment. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 965 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 22 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 90 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Shoulder 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "Small cuts". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was in range of shrapnel from the demolition, was not wearing PPE and was not taking cover. 
The person with field responsibility should have ensured that he was. The secondary cause is 
listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because it seems that the accident was treated 
as “unavoidable”, which implies that the system in use was approved by the management and 
no need to make changes was recognised. 
The delay in sending the Victim to hospital after he reported that his arm was numb cannot be 
excused by having a lot of other tasks to get done and implies considerable irresponsibility on 
the part of the ex-patriot field supervisor responsible. 
With no report other than the notoriously inadequate IMSMA form, it is not clear whether the 
demining group drew any conclusions from the accident.  
IMSMA accident records have always been over-simplified and entirely “Inadequate”  for use 
in determining causes and so deriving any useful lessons from the events. The UN supported 
MAC in Sri Lanka has generally failed to conduct independent investigations and has failed 
(despite requests) to make any available records available to the DDAS, so ignoring the 
requirements of the IMAS.  
The Demining group involved in this accident is thanked for its transparency in making their 
record available. 
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